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A New Dawn   
 
The present volume represents a new stage in the relationship between the International 
Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ICLARS) and Ashgate publishing. Although 
collections based on papers from previous ICLARS conferences have been published by 
Ashgate,1 this is the first collection of such papers to be published as part of ICLARS’ own 
book series at Ashgate, the ICLARS Series on Law and Religion. 
The establishment of this new series is entirely appropriate. In the 21st century, issues 
around the globe concerning law and religion are never far from the news headlines. Acts of 
terrorism committed in the name of religion; moral panics concerning the operation of 
religious courts; controversies about the relationship between freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion; disputes about the wearing of religious dress and symbols; the role of 
religion in marriage law and in the education system; and questions about the autonomy of 
religious groups are just some of the issues that continue to excite controversy in society at 
large. Thoroughly different and often entrenched views exist as to the role of religion in the 
public sphere. 
These controversies often have a legal dimension. Lawyers – both practitioners and 
academics – are increasingly focusing upon law and religion matters. In some jurisdictions, 
law and religion is becoming regarded as an academic subject for the first time, studied and 
researched like family law or employment law. Elsewhere, where aspects of law and religion 
have long been studied and taught, there has also been a significant change: the focus has 
mutated to increasingly include the study of religious freedom as a human right and the 
religious laws of religious minorities.  
The academic study of law and religion has become more visible and more important 
in recent years as a result of the same changes that have made the role of religion in the 
public sphere controversial. The ICLARS initiative has played an important role in this 
development. ICLARS was organized in 2007 as an international network of scholars and 
experts of law and religion, with the aim to provide a place where information, data, and 
opinions could easily be exchanged among members and made available to the broader 
scientific community. Its work so far has been prolific, hosting impressive conferences, 
maintaining an excellent website, and having a number of first-class specialist journals.2  
The new ICLARS Series on Law and Religion takes this activity a stage further, 
providing a forum for the rapidly expanding field of research in law and religion with the 
intention of becoming a principal source for students and scholars while presenting authors 
with a valuable means to reach a wide and growing readership. It will be a home not only for 
edited collections resulting from ICLARS conferences and other ICLARS events but also for 
the very best law and religion scholarship from across the globe. The term ‘law and religion’ 
will be widely defined3 and the Series will include both edited collections arising from 
                                                 
1. Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori, eds., Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations between States and 
Religious Communities (Ashgate 2010); and W. Cole Durham, Jr., Silvio Ferrari, Cristiana Cianitto & Donlu 
Thayer, eds., Law, Religion, Constitution: Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment and the Law (Ashgate 2013).  
2. Further information can be found on the website: http://www.iclars.org/. 
3. For discussion of the definition of the term see Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University 
Press 2011), 6, which proposes that ‘the study of law and religion is at least the study of religion law and 
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important events and cutting-edge monographs by both established names and by new voices. 
The ICLARS Series on Law and Religion Series will include interdisciplinary works, 
comparative examinations and detailed studies of particular jurisdictions. In short, it will be 
home to the wide ranging and dynamic scholarship produced by academics with an interest in 
and passion for law and religion around the globe, reflecting the increasing societal, political 
and legal interest in religion.4  
It is fitting that the Series is published by Ashgate, who have already printed edited 
works resulting from the first two ICLARS conferences and who have a reputation for 
producing outstanding cutting-edge work in this field, as shown by their very successful 
‘Cultural Diversity and Law’ book series including those published under the framework of 
the EU RELIGARE project on ‘Religious Diversity and Secular Models in Europe’. 
 
Taking the Temperature 
 
It might appear, therefore, that the emergence of the ICLARS Series on Law and Religion 
Series published by Ashgate was inevitable. However, the fact that religion is receiving more 
scholarly attention in the 21st century than the 20th and that this is especially the case in 
relation to legal scholarship is actually rather surprising.  
Speaking in 1888 as part of a course of lectures on ‘The Constitutional History of 
England’, Frederic Maitland suggested that ‘religious liberty and religious equality is 
complete.’5 The extent to which lawyers in the 21st century are concerned with matters of 
‘religious liberty and religious equality’ both in Maitland’s home country and around the 
world would have clearly surprised England’s greatest legal historian.  
In many respects, it is important not to be too critical of Maitland’s assertion. His 
understanding of ‘religious liberty and religious equality’ was narrowly related to the 
toleration of the right of religious groups to worship and of adherents of all faiths to hold 
public offices. In these respects, his statement remains broadly accurate. And Maitland’s 
account of the historical development of religion under English law continues to be the 
starting point for the subject.6  However, what Maitland failed to see is that the question of 
religious freedom – both at a collective and an individual level – would not only continue to 
be important and irresolvable but would grow in significance, giving rise to a large body of 
law. 
It is perfectly understandable that Maitland would not have predicted this situation. A 
number of complex political, religious, and sociological changes have affected the place of 
religion within society since 1888. These include not only the increased religious pluralism 
and diversity that has come about as a result in part of increased mobility and immigration 
but also consequences of new ways of thinking. Modern technology has made the world a 
much smaller place and has put information at our finger tips. These changes have all 
impacted what we believe and what we consider the role of the law ought to be in terms of 
accommodating freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.  
                                                                                                                                                        
religious law’: that is, ‘religion law’, the ‘external’ temporal laws  made by the state, international bodies and 
sub-state institutions that affect religious individuals and groups and ‘religious law; the ‘internal’ spiritual laws 
or regulations made by religious groups themselves which affect the members of those groups and how that 
group interacts with the secular legal regime. 
4. See the Foreword to this volume.  
5. Frederic W. Maitland, Constitutional History of England (Cambridge University Press 1908), 520. 
6. In particular, Frederic W. Maitland, Roman Canon Law in the Church of England (Methuen1898). For 
appraisal see, for example, James R. Cameron, Frederick William Maitland and the History of English Law 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1961), Chapter IV; and H. Edith Bell, Maitland: A Critical Examination and 
Assessment (Adam & Charles Black 1965), Chapter VIII. 
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There have also been significant changes in terms of religious beliefs and practices. 
The picture is complex, and there is significant variation from place to place as a result of a 
myriad of factors that are historical, geographical, sociological, cultural, political, economical 
and theological. Any single attempt to explain the picture is bound to be over-simplistic, 
whether it is Enlightenment era inspired prophecies about the social decline of religion or 
21st century statements that religion has returned.7 Predictions about the death of God and the 
demise of the secularization thesis are both premature.8 However, both also have elements of 
truth about them. Most societies are no longer mono-creedal, and several societies, especially 
those in Europe, are clearly more secular than they once were, though, of course, the meaning 
and consequence of the term ‘secular’ is open to much debate. Moreover, sophisticated 
versions of the secularization thesis, which provide a more nuanced assessment than simply 
stating that God is dead in modern society, have not been debunked by the so-called ‘return 
of religion’.9 Secularization theories are limited: they can only provide a limited account of 
the role of religion in society because they are what Charles Taylor has called ‘subtraction 
stories’ in that they only explain the fortunes of those forms of religiosity which were 
previously dominant.10 However, such theories can provide part of the picture, provided it is 
remembered that patterns of religious change are historically and geographically specific and 
operate at different levels affecting social institutions, religious institutions, and individuals 
in different ways.11   
One explanation is to suggest that two waves of secularization have occurred in the 
Western world.12 The first wave consisted of the (on-going) battles of modernity which began 
with the Enlightenment. The key process was that of differentiation.13 Rather than one 
institution (the Church) performing a myriad of social functions, a range of specialist 
institutions developed (the state, the education system, the media, the family, the churches, 
etc.) each performing specific functions. The result of this was that the Church moved away 
from the center of social life: it was no longer the main or unique educator, discipliner, 
instiller of societal values). The second wave can be said to have affected the individual 
rather than societal level and to have occurred following the Second World War and in the 
sixties in particular, provided ‘the hinge moment, at least symbolically’, ushering in ‘an 
individuating revolution’.14 This led to what has been referred to as the ‘subjective turn’;15 
the way in which the ‘subjectivities of each individual became a, if not the, unique source of 
significance, meaning and authority’.16 This describes the increased focus people placed upon 
                                                 
7. See, further, Russell Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society, (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
8. See, by way of comparison, Steve Bruce, God is Dead (Blackwell 2002), and Rodney Stark, ‘Secularisation 
RIP’, (1999) 60 Sociology of Religion (3) 249. 
9. This is true of the work of Steve Bruce despite the sensationalist title of his 2002 book. See, in particular, 
Steve Bruce, Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory (Oxford Universty Press 2011). 
10. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press 2007), 22.  
11. Karel Dobbelaere, Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels (Peter Lang 2002). 
12. Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society, supra note 7 at 171.  
13. See further, Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society, supra note 7 at 64. The concept of differentiation is also 
central to the social systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. For a discussion of its potential application in relation to 
law and religion see Russell Sandberg, ‘Religious Law as a Social System’, in Russell Sandberg, ed., Religion 
and Legal Pluralism (Ashgate 2015), and Russell Sandberg, ‘A Sociological Theory of Law and Religion’ in 
Frank Cranmer, Mark Hill QC, Celia Kenny & Russell Sandberg, eds., The Confluence of Law and Religion: 
Interdisciplinary Reflections on the Work of Norman Doe (Cambridge University Press forthcoming).  
14. Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today (Harvard University Press 2002), 80. 
15. See, for example, Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University Press 1991), 26; Sandberg, 
Religion, Law and Society, supra note 7 at 161. 
16. Paul Heelas & Linda Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution (Blackwell 2005).  
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the construction and re-construction of personal identities.17 This has resulted from a lack of 
trust in public institutions and a death of deference.  We are now less deferential to authority 
than we once were and we tend to define ourselves much more by our achieved status rather 
than our ascribed positions. Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
Communism old certainties continued to collapse. And such trends have escalated in recent 
years. The closing years of the 20th century and start of 21st century have been the era of 
globalization, the fragmentation of politics, the rise of the Internet, and a number of scandals 
concerning the financial industries, the political classes, the media and the historical 
churches. 
The result of these complex and often contradictory social changes is that the place of 
religion in the public sphere has become controversial. We are now much more questioning 
of all forms of authority, including religious authority. Most societies are now much more 
diverse in terms of life experiences, including religious experiences. In an ever-changing 
world, older traditional ways of life are misunderstood but newer seemingly different beliefs 
and practices are also treated with caution if not hostility, since an age of declining certainties 
provides a climate for increased fears. The traditionalist and the outsider both become the 
Other.  This is affecting the very way in which we talk about religion.  Issues concerning law 
and religion are now inherently divisive and contentious in our post-9/11 age, where the very 
suggestion that some people may owe a loyalty to a source of authority other than the nation 
state causes suspicion. 
These social changes have resulted in a lack of consensus about the place of religion. 
This has been partially manifested in a significant increase in legislation and litigation about 
religious matters in many jurisdictions, while other jurisdictions have seen existing laws 
affecting religion become increasingly controversial with disputes being reported, simplified, 
and played out in the media. This trend has been have referred to as the ‘juridification of 
religion’ and can be said to have three dimensions:18 first, ‘legal explosion’, that is, the 
process ‘through which law comes to regulate an increasing number of different activities’; 
second, the increase in litigation whereby ‘conflicts increasingly are being solved by or with 
reference to law’; and third, ‘legal framing’, that is; the process ‘by which people 
increasingly tend to think of themselves and others as legal subjects’.19 ‘Legal framing’ 
denotes the way in which reference to law is used outside the courtroom both as a way of 
solving conflict and also to shape policy.  This is shown by the way in which the language of 
religious rights has begun to enter into the public discourse, as a result of the new legal 
obligations and the media reporting of litigation and is evident in the number of courses, 
guidelines, and policies which employers and public authorities now have concerning 
religion.  
This ‘juridification of religion’ has led to an increase in the profile of law and 
religion, but at a cost. The fact that contentious issues and cases have enjoyed a high media 
profile has been unfortunate, given that the media reception of the issues has often been 
informed by a base fear of religious difference.20 Complex issues have been over-simplified 
by a media perplexed by the complex social changes that have occurred. And the political 
                                                 
17. See, further, Russell Sandberg, ‘The Impossible Compromise’, in Sandberg, ed., Religion and Legal 
Pluralism, supra note 13 at 1.  
18. Sandberg, Law and Religion, supra note 3, Chapter 10.  
19. Lars C. Blicher & Anders Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’, (2008) 14 European Law Journal (1) 36. 
20. This has been epitomised by the ill-informed public debate concerning Sharia law and Sharia courts, on 
which see, for example, Ralph Grillo, Muslim, Families, Politics and the Law (Ashgate 2015). For an example 
of research which has sought to replace this heat with light see the ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, 
Divorce and Religious Courts’ Research Project carried out by Gillian Douglas and her colleagues at Cardiff 
University, funded by the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Programme , 
http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/research/cohesion.html. 
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haste in passing new laws or revising existing laws has often left judges to reach sociological 
decisions which they are ill-equipped to do.21 A number of unfortunate shortcuts have been 
taken: decision–makers have favoured ‘binary’ solutions where adherents are forced to 
choose between following their religious beliefs and enjoying the citizenship rights they 
would otherwise enjoy under state law; and it is often assumed that religious groups are 
homogenous entities where all believers share identical beliefs and a direct link between 
creedal assent and behaviour can be assumed. 22   
     
The Same Rain 
 
It is possible, however, to overestimate the novelty of the situation in which we find 
ourselves. The number of moral panics concerning religion in recent years suggests that the 
lack of consensus about how to accommodate religious difference is a new problem. It is not. 
It is true, of course, that recent years have seen a number of often unexpected storm clouds 
concerning religion and that even experts in the field have been taken aback by the torrential 
nature of the downpour. But while the causes of such storms are new, the storms themselves 
have been experienced before. It is the same rain. Concerns about apparently religiously 
motivated acts of violence are not new. Moral panics about the otherness of those who 
practice Islam rehearse fears that were previously reserved for those who practiced non-
sanctioned forms of Christianity. We have been here before. The current position is the 
product of both change and continuity. 
However, it is not simply a case of history repeating itself. The storm clouds do differ 
from place to place. This underlines the need to understand particular downpours in context. 
Our analysis of any particular storm – say the clash between religious and non-religious 
views on the nature of marriage – will be enriched if we understand it in the context of other 
storms across the ages and if we are able to compare the situation across jurisdictions. 
Explorations of issues concerning law and religion can benefit from the work that has already 
been done, whether that is historical or comparative in nature. 
This is one of the reasons why networks of law and religion scholars such as ICLARS 
are important. They provide a home for such historical and comparative work, whether that 
be the product of one academic or the opportunity for scholars to collaborate or to learn from 
each other’s research. Academic networks provide a number of means by which we can 
ensure that today’s scholarship builds upon yesterday’s achievements and that we do not 
simply constantly re-invent the wheel. Conferences and other symposiums, specialist 
journals, and email updates allow us to be aware of what others are doing. They allow us to 
draw upon each other’s work and to make comparisons across time and place. 
The present volume, in line with the work of ICLARS generally, seeks to facilitate 
this by bringing to a larger audience revised papers from the third ICLARS conference on 
‘Religion, Democracy and Equality’ which was held in the United States, in Virginia, from 
21-23 August 2013. 
 
A Changing Climate  
 
This book is the first of two collections of revised papers from the third ICLARS conference. 
It focuses on religion and equality in two respects: the first is to focus on the development of 
                                                 
21. An example of this is the growing emphasis on proportionality on which see Megan Pearson, 
‘Proportionality: A Way Forward for Resolving Religious Claims?’ in Nick Spencer, ed., Religion and Law 
(Theos 2012), 35. 
22. See, further, Russell Sandberg, ‘The Impossible Compromise’, in Sandberg, Religion and Legal Pluralism 
supra note 13 at 1.  
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religion as an anti-discrimination norm generally; the second is to focus on religion within the 
context of the recognition same-sex marriage. These focuses are connected.  
 The development of religion as an anti-discrimination norm has occurred as a result of 
the impact of international and national laws dealing with equality upon religious groups and 
believers. On the one hand, the tension between the law of the state and the autonomy of 
belief communities is not new.23 Yet, on the other hand, the issue has become markedly more 
important in recent years not only as a result of the social changes discussed above but also 
because of changes in the legal regulation. The major change has been the development of 
international legal human rights standards following the Second World War. Although 
provisions protecting religious freedom were commonplace in many national constitutions 
before this time, the development of religious freedom as a human right in an international 
framework provided a watershed moment. The post-War period has seen the development of 
human rights instruments at global and regional levels, with provisions being interpreted and 
refined by the creation of soft law and judicial decisions. These judicial decisions have 
furthered the ‘juridification of religion’. Recourse to arguments based on constitutional or 
international human rights law and equality provisions have become commonplace in 
disputes concerning religion. International standards have influenced in several respects the 
interpretation of religious freedom and equality provisions at a state and sub-state level.  
 Moreover, religious equality is not the only protected ground under the plethora of 
international, national, and sub-national legal instruments. Laws protecting equality based on 
race, sex, and sexual orientation in particular have had an impact upon religious freedom. 
There has been much talk of the ‘clash of rights’. The question of to what extent, if any, 
religious groups and individuals should be able to apply different standards as to religious, 
race, sex, and sexual orientation discrimination has been asked in several different contexts. 
Should religious groups be able to insist that their leaders and representatives follow doctrinal 
teachings in terms of both what they preach and what they practice? Should religious 
institutions be able to reserve certain offices to members of one sex only? Should religious 
courts be able to make rulings that breach state law standards as to gender equality? Should a 
religious registrar be able to refuse to conduct same-sex marriages? Should religious 
organizations be obliged to provide services for such couples?  
These last two questions refer to a particular tension that has emerged in many states 
in recent years: the clash between the right to religious freedom and the right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation. In most jurisdictions, the legal 
regulations of religious and sexual identities have taken a similar trajectory.24 Historically, 
the law discriminated against people of certain religions and sexual orientations, often by the 
criminalization of activities on grounds of the sex of participants.25  Over time, however, 
many but not all of these disadvantages and criminal offences were removed. The previously 
illegal forms of religiosity and sexual identity became tolerated but they were still seen as 
being unusual. This toleration was achieved on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis.  This stance of 
non-discrimination was then gradually superseded by the active promotion of anti-
discrimination. This involved the promulgation of laws forbidding discrimination on grounds 
of religion and sexual orientation and the development of the notion that these forms of 
identity were protected as subjective constitutional and / or human rights. This stance of anti-
discrimination has led to the revisiting of laws and practices which explicitly or implicitly 
discriminate against minorities by normalizing majority practices and assumptions. This has 
                                                 
23. The underlying tension can be seen New Testament instruction to ‘render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s and unto God, the things that are God’s’: Matthew 22:21. 
24. Russell Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’, (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2) 157-181. 
25. For an examination of the historical development of laws protecting sexual orientation, see Stephen Cretney, 
Same Sex Relationships: From Odious Crime to ‘Gay Marriage’ (Oxford University Press 2006).  
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meant changes, for instance, to how the law defines terms such as religion, the family, and 
marriage. 
Although the journeys of the legal regulation of religion and sexual orientation have 
been similar, the journey began much later in relation to sexual orientation than religion and 
has been far quicker. The move from the law discriminating against homosexuality to the law 
prohibiting such discrimination has occurred over decades rather than centuries. Much has 
changed in the early years of the 21st century. Many jurisdictions created legal relationships 
and institutions that are functionally equivalent to marriage and then many states have now 
gone further in their quest for equality to recognize same-sex marriages. These rapid social 
changes have posed particular problems for some religious groups and believers. Opinions 
and stances which were the norm just a few decades ago are now regarded as being 
discriminatory, prejudiced, and even bigoted. Changing societal understandings of marriage 
in particular have proved challenging given the role that religious groups have traditionally 
played with marriages often taking place in religious settings using religious rites.26  
 
This book falls into two sections. The first, ‘Religion and Anti-Discrimination 
Norms’, explores how religion has developed as an anti-discrimination norm, examining the 
developing law on equality and human rights and how it operates at international and national 
levels. The second section, ‘Religion and Same Sex Marriage’, then provides a case study, 
exploring the contemporary issue of same-sex marriage and how it affects religious groups 
and believers.  
The first section begins with a chapter by Romanian scholar Nicolae Dură that sets the 
scene by providing a tour de force of how religion is protected by international laws at both a 
global and regional level. The chapter introduces and analyzes the legal framework 
concerning freedom of religion at the International level before exploring the instruments and 
institutions at a pan-European level.  The chapter distinguishes the separate but increasingly 
connected protections afforded by the Council of Europe and the European Union, a theme 
which is developed in the chapter that follows by Mark Hill QC. While the European Court 
of Human Rights at Strasbourg – a product of the Council of Europe – has spent the last two 
decades generating an increasingly complex case law concerning religious freedom, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg – an institution of the European Union – has 
only started to deal with religious matters in enforcing EU directives forbidding 
discrimination on grounds of religion. Hill’s chapter compares the two courts and their 
interrelationship, an issue that is likely to become increasingly important. The next chapter, 
by María J. Valero Estarellas, furthers this analysis by focusing on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, looking in particular at the recent controversial case law 
concerning religion in the workplace. The chapter explores not only the decisions themselves 
                                                 
26. There is considerable variation, however, in the extent to which state law recognizes religious marriages. For 
example, in his study of the laws of European states, Norman Doe noted that, it is a principle of religion law 
common to the states of Europe that ‘The State must permit the celebration of marriage in a religious context 
following a civil marriage’ and ‘may recognize a marriage conducted in accordance with a religious rite as 
having a civil effect either from the moment of its ritual celebration or from the moment of its civil registration 
provided the conditions set down by law are met’. Doe pointed out that, although all states permitted the 
celebration of a religious marriage following a civil marriage, there are three models in terms of the formation 
and recognition of religious marriages. The first model consists of ‘States which recognize the validity and 
public effects of certain religious marriages formed at the time of their ritual celebration, provided the 
conditions of civil law are met’. The second comprises ‘States which recognize Catholic marriages as religious 
marriage with civil effect from the time of their ritual celebration’ The third consists of ‘States which do not 
recognize religious marriages at all, but may permit a religious ceremony subsequent to a civil marriage, or 
indeed penalize their solemnization under criminal law if conducted prior to a civil marriage’: Norman Doe, 
Law and Religion in Europe (Oxford University Press 2011), 264, 216. 
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but also the changes in the interpretation of Article 9, identifying new principles being 
developed by the Strasbourg Court. The chapter underscores how, although the text of 
instruments protecting religious freedom remain unchanged, the interpretation of such 
provisions evolve in light of changing social tensions and also as a result of a growing 
confidence by court actors. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on 
religion is no longer in its infancy; it has now entered a period of adolescence and the 
growing pains are often all too evident.  
Similar experiences can be found at the national level in both Europe and elsewhere. 
This is underscored in the last two chapters in this first section. The chapter by Rodrigo Alves 
chapter provides an examination of how anti-discrimination law concerning religion has 
developed and is developing in Brazil. The Brazilian experience should be of much wider 
interest since the chapter reveals how the country is peacefully undergoing one of the most 
dramatic religious shifts in the world today. It is important, however, not to simply focus 
upon developments at a constitutional level, be that internationally or nationally. And so the 
final chapter in this section, by Greg Walsh, zooms in to a particular issue: the employment 
decisions of religious schools under anti-discrimination legislation in the Australian State of 
New South Wales. This provides a concrete case study of many of the themes explored in the 
section as a whole. The chapter also raises the issue of exceptions or exemptions afforded in 
the name of religion: should religious schools be exempt from generally applicable laws 
forbidding discrimination?  This issue concerning what may be referred to as ‘the right to 
discriminate’ has led to a significant literature by scholars interested in law and religion in 
recent years which has explored the interplay between laws protecting freedom of religion 
and forbidding discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation.  
The second section, ‘Religion and Same Sex Marriage’, focuses on these concerns. 
The section begins with another tour de force, this time by Rex Ahdar, which explores how 
laws on same-sex marriage in New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom interact with 
religious freedom. In particular, the chapter explores the extent to which exemptions have 
been provided for celebrants (that is, religious ministers, clergy, marriage celebrants, 
commissioners, and registrars) to enable them to refuse to conduct same-sex marriages. In all 
three jurisdictions studied by Ahdar, the reformulation of marriage law has been fairly recent, 
though Canada provides a significantly earlier experience, and has been shaped by the aim to 
provide equality on grounds of sexual orientation. In contrast, in other jurisdictions there has 
been a much longer experience of reformulating marriage laws for other purposes. Pieter 
Coertzen’s chapter provides a detailed exploration of the development of the law relating to 
marriage in South Africa, exploring the earlier and much more wide-ranging re-definition of 
marriage that has occurred there.    
The issues present in both Adhar and Coertzen’s chapters are then revisited in a 
chapter by Argentine family law scholar Ursula Basset, who not only takes a step back to 
explore the redefinition of marriage in Europe but provides not-often-seen information about 
these issues as developed in the Americas, through General Assembly resolutions of the 
Organization of American States, provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
and relevant opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This section concludes 
with two chapters by U.S. scholars, the first by Helen Alvaré, who provides a detailed view 
of the Catholic understanding of marriage, in light of imputations of animus in all opposition 
to same-sex marriage, made in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court case United States 
v. Windsor.27 Such concerns as Alvaré raises about potential threats to religious autonomy, 
arising from such a high-level imputation of malign motives for holding a traditional 
religious belief, have been amplified for many by the Court’s subsequent decision in 
                                                 
27. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
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Obergefell v. Hodges,28 which found a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 
These issues are developed in the final chapter in this section, by Thomas Berg and Douglas 
Laycock, which adopts a synoptic approach, to explore the current state of U.S. law in 
relation to same-sex marriage and the protection of religious autonomy. The book then closes 
with a chapter by W. Cole Durham that explores the themes of the book as a whole, 
examining amongst other things the role of exemptions and the concept of reasonable 
accommodation to engage with the work of Heiner Bielefeldt, who kindly provided the 
preface to this volume and a keynote address at the third ICLARS conference. 
The issue of same-sex marriage and the wider tensions between religious and sexual 
identities is just one of the ways in which religion is interacting with equality laws in the 21st 
century. Other interactions will be explored not only in the second collection of chapters 
originally presented at the third ICLARS conference but also in other books which will be 
published under the auspices of ICLARS Series on Law and Religion. The chapters that 
appear here, together with those published in the earlier volumes by Ashgate,29 underscore 
how dynamic, controversial, and important interactions between law and religion can be. 
However, the work published to date is just the tip of the iceberg. The ambition of the Series 
is to reflect the wide-ranging ambit and ambition of scholarship in this and related fields and 
to stimulate and encourage its further growth. The early years of the 21st century have seen 
storm clouds gather as social and political tensions have erupted in a downpour of issues, 
laws, and decisions that have affected religious freedoms. It would be foolish to speculate as 
to what weather is likely to lie ahead. But even if calmer or sunnier times are to come, there 
will remain the need for scholars to address the short- and long-term effects of the storm in a 
calm and erudite manner away from the glare and sensationalism of the media. There will 
need to be a place whereby increasingly ambitious analyses can be disseminated to the 
scholars around the world, who, although they experience local variations invariably share 
experiences of common issues. ICLARS in general and the ICLARS Series on Law and 
Religion are designed to provide that place for formulating, sharing, and discussing insights, 
ideas and speculations. It is hoped that this volume provides the start of a new stage of 
increased collaboration not only between ICLARS and Ashgate but among those around the 




                                                 
28. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
29. Ferrari & Cristofori, Law and Religion in the 21st Century, supra note 1; and Durham et al., eds., Law, 
Religion, Constitution, supra note 1.  
